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Refugees or Illegal Immigrants: The Problem of the Group
in Refugee Protection
AL E X A N D R I A J . IN N E S
City, University of London, UK
This research excavates the case of Jewish refugees in Cyprus between 1946 and 1948. I argue that this case is formative of
the development not just of the refugee, but—perhaps more interestingly—of the concept of “illegal immigration,” which
relies on the constructed impossibility of group-based refugee protection. I contend that there is a paradox residing at the
heart of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition of a refugee that produces the refugee as a singular victim while supporting
the very conditions that create that victimhood—that is, persecution targeted at an identity group where the persecution is
motivated by the shared identity (defined in the Refugee Convention by race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion). As the architecture of international human rights was built, the refugee definition was
drafted in a way that embedded group-based exclusion in the design of the definition. I exemplify this through the case of
Jewish refugees attempting to reach British Mandate Palestine in the 1940s, who were intercepted and detained in Cyprus.
The case is worthy of attention because it exposes the absence of group protection in the refugee definition and the effect of
that absence: a group is constituted as a threat and cannot be defined collectively as refugees. Instead, they become “illegal
immigrants.” This case study of Jewish detention in Cyprus provides a key empirical example of oppression residing inside a
historically liberal movement and in the resulting conditions of refugee protection.
Cette recherche explore le cas des réfugiés juifs à Chypre entre 1946 et 1948. Je soutiens que ce cas est formateur non seule-
ment concernant le développement du concept de réfugié, mais aussi—peut-être plus intéressant—de celui « d’immigration
clandestine » qui repose sur l’impossibilité construite d’une protection des réfugiés basée sur un groupe. J’affirme qu’un
paradoxe réside au cœur de la définition de réfugié de la Convention sur les réfugiés de 1951 qui présente le réfugié comme
une victime singulière tout en s’appuyant sur les conditions mêmes qui créent ce statut de victime—c’est-à-dire, la persécution
ciblée sur un groupe identitaire, cette persécution étant motivée par une identité partagée (définie dans la Convention sur les
réfugiés par race, religion, nationalité, appartenance à un certain groupe social ou opinion politique). Au fil de la construc-
tion de l’architecture des droits de l’homme internationaux, la définition de réfugié a été ébauchée de manière à intégrer
l’exclusion basée sur un groupe dans sa conception. J’illustre cela par le cas des réfugiés juifs tentant d’atteindre la Palestine
sous mandat britannique dans les années 40 qui étaient interceptés et détenus à Chypre. Ce cas mérite notre attention car
il expose l’absence de protection de groupe dans la définition de réfugié et l’effet de cette absence: un groupe est constitué
comme une menace et ne peut être défini collectivement comme réfugiés. Au lieu de cela, ils deviennent des « immigrants
clandestins ». Cette étude de cas de la détention des Juifs à Chypre offre un exemple empirique clé de l’oppression résidant
dans un mouvement historiquement libéral et dans les conditions de protection des réfugiés qui en résultent.
Esta investigación analiza el caso de los refugiados judíos en Chipre entre 1946 y 1948. Sostengo que este caso constituye la base
del desarrollo no solo del refugiado, sino también, y quizás sea lo más interesante, del concepto de “inmigración ilegal,” que
se basa en la imposibilidad construida de la protección de los refugiados por grupos. Considero que existe una paradoja que
reside en el seno de la definición de refugiado de la Convención sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados de 1951, que presenta al
refugiado como una víctima singular, al tiempo que apoya las mismas condiciones que crean esa condición de víctima, es decir,
la persecución dirigida a un grupo de identidad donde la persecución está motivada por la identidad compartida (definida en
la Convención de Refugiados por raza, religión, nacionalidad, pertenencia a un grupo social particular u opinión política). A
medida que se fue construyendo la estructura de los derechos humanos internacionales, la definición de refugiado se redactó
de manera que la exclusión por grupos quedara integrada en el diseño de la definición. Lo ejemplifico con el caso de los
refugiados judíos que intentaban llegar al Mandato Británico de Palestina en la década de 1940, que fueron interceptados y
detenidos en Chipre. El caso es digno de atención porque pone en evidencia la falta de protección de grupo en la definición
de refugiado, y el efecto de esa ausencia es: un grupo constituye una amenaza y no puede definirse colectivamente como
refugiados. En su lugar, se convierten en “inmigrantes ilegales.” Este estudio de caso sobre la detención de judíos en Chipre
proporciona un ejemplo empírico clave de la opresión que reside en el interior de un movimiento históricamente liberal y en
las consecuencias de la protección de los refugiados.
Introduction
At the end of World War II, huge numbers of displaced
persons across Europe sought repatriation or resettlement.
This of course included Jewish refugees, who were displaced
from former homes in Europe and who had survived the
persecution and genocide of the Holocaust. Many Jewish
refugees made their way toward Palestine, which was then
under British mandate rule while territorial boundaries,
sovereignty, and settlement were negotiated. Britain did
not want to risk the mandate in Palestine and the negoti-
ations for partition by permitting the landing of large num-
bers of Jewish refugees in Palestine1; yet alternative resettle-
ment proved problematic. Instead, Britain detained Jewish
refugees in camps on the island of Cyprus, then a British
Crown Colony. These camps inhibited freedom of move-
ment and quickly became overcrowded prisons where Jewish
1 This was discussed in correspondence between the UN delegation for the
United Kingdom and the Foreign Office in October 1947, FO 371/61894.
Innes, Alexandria J. (2021) Refugees or Illegal Immigrants: The Problem of the Group in Refugee Protection. Global Studies Quarterly, https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab023
© The Author(s) (2021). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,






/isagsq/article/1/3/ksab023/6373827 by guest on 20 O
ctober 2021
2 Refugees or Illegal Immigrants
refugees were detained indefinitely, behind barbed wire and
armed patrols, awaiting a resolution (Goldman 2015). It was
not uncommon for Jewish refugees (and other refugees and
persons displaced as a result of World War II) to be housed
in detention camps across Europe in the late 1940s. Despite
the forced nature of their displacement and the evidenced
persecution of Jews in Europe, Britain adopted the language
of “illegal immigration” in the context of detention camps
that apprehended the movement of Jewish refugees. The
documentary evidence from the British Colonial Office and
the Foreign Office in the case of Cyprus demonstrates the
emphasis on preventing unlawful boat landings and immi-
gration into Palestine. The recourse to the law in this case
can be understood as a means of rhetorically justifying in-
definite detention and a lack of access to habeas corpus at a
time when the promulgation of universal human rights was
dominating the international stage.
This research excavates this case of Jewish refugees in
Cyprus post-World War II, between 1946 and 1948. I argue
that this case is formative of the development not just of the
refugee, but—perhaps more interestingly—of the concept
of “illegal immigration,” which relies on the constructed
impossibility of group-based refugee protection. I contend
that there is a paradox residing at the heart of the 1951
Refugee Convention definition of a refugee that produces
the refugee as a singular victim while supporting the very
conditions that create that victimhood—that is, persecution
targeted at an identity group where the persecution is mo-
tivated by the shared identity (defined in the Refugee Con-
vention by race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion).
This research considers how the refugee is produced as
a victim while the conditions that create that victimhood
are maintained within the Refugee Convention definition
and its use. I exemplify this through the case of Jewish
refugees attempting to reach British Mandate Palestine in
the 1940s, who were intercepted and detained in Cyprus.
The case is worthy of attention because it exposes the ab-
sence of group protection in the refugee definition and the
effect of that absence: a group is constituted as a threat
and cannot be defined collectively as a group of refugees.
Instead, they become “illegal immigrants.” This labeling
evokes the idea of the law and rhetorically justifies detention
or imprisonment by establishing such immigrants as unlaw-
ful and therefore needing to be contained as a matter of
security. The renaming of the group is necessary because
the idea of refugee protection allows liberal states to see
themselves as protecting universal human rights and offer-
ing refuge and access to rights for persecuted people. This
case study of Jewish detention in Cyprus provides a key em-
pirical example of oppression residing inside a historically
liberal movement and in the resulting conditions of refugee
protection.
This article proceeds as follows: I first consider how the
refugee fits into the context of international human rights.
I make a case for the significance of the problem of “the
group” in the development of the refugee definition before
turning to the case study. In this case study, I demonstrate
how British internment camps for Jewish refugees in Cyprus
between 1946 and 1948 illustrate the problem of the group
and how the refugee definition only protects individual vic-
tims of persecution, while supporting the conditions that
produce that victimhood. The group itself in this case be-
comes officially cast as a group of “illegal immigrants” who
must be contained and who can be detained indefinitely be-
cause they have undertaken unlawful action of migrating
without permission.
Human Rights and Refugees: The Problem of the Group
The definition of a refugee established in 1951 is as follows:
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951
and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is out-
side the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a na-
tionality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UN
General Assembly 1951).
Generally speaking, we understand the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention to serve the purpose of protecting refugees that
were created during World War II. Indeed, the Conven-
tion definition of a refugee included the specification that
refugees were identified only “as a result of events occurring
before 1 January 1951” with the subsequent clarification that
this actually means “events occurring in Europe before Jan-
uary 1951”; however, it is notable that most signatories to
the 1951 Convention chose to declare a more expansive def-
inition of “in Europe or elsewhere.” However, states were
able to safely choose the geographically expanded defini-
tion because of the protections afforded to them in the de-
sign and application of the definition. The wording of the
definition limited opportunities for refugees to be guaran-
teed status, leaving the power to determine who is deserving
of protection solely with the awarding state (Hathaway 1997,
2005; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007). Furthermore, the
term “persecution” is defined by the convention as the per-
secution of an individual. That is, it explicitly does not
cover groups fleeing war, or mass movements of people who
are collectively victim to natural or environmental disaster.
More pertinently, the convention does not offer protection
for groups “suffering from some type of incessant prejudice”
(McFadyen 2012). Thus, access to protection from persecu-
tion under the Refugee Convention is substantially limited.
Universal human rights are promulgated in international
law, most expansively in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and in the International Covenant on So-
cial, Economic, and Cultural Rights. State signatories to these
Covenants guarantee human rights for their citizens. Thus,
the state, holding sovereignty over territory and population,
is the key defender of human rights. Yet, an oft-cited para-
dox of human rights law and institutions suggests that the
state is both the key defender of human rights, while si-
multaneously the worst offender of human rights (Donnelly
1999; Vincent 2010). There are unavoidably some gaps in
protection where humans cannot rely on the protection of
their state: they might be outside of the jurisdiction of their
state but not offered protection by their host, or they might
be stateless persons who are unable to avail themselves of
the protection of any state. The Refugee Convention is one
of the few pieces of legislation that is designed to counteract
that paradox by calling on states to offer protection to peo-
ple who are not their citizens, along with the Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Stateless Persons, the Genocide Conven-
tion, and, more recently, the commitment to the “Responsi-
bility to Protect.”
Mayblin (2017) and Krause (2021) argue that the 1951
Refugee Convention was dominated by the power interests
of colonial and imperial states, and refugees outside of
Europe were marginalized. This was not because they were
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them did not serve the interests of the dominant colonial
and imperial states (Krause 2021; also, see Odhiambo-
Abuya 2005 and Ballinger 2016). Mayblin asserts that, the
“colonial order” in the post-war transition period “was
ultimately successful in making human rights exclusive to
certain territories and consequently excluding large num-
bers of the world’s population” (Mayblin 2017, 143). She
cites government documents that suggest “a genuine belief
that colonised and previously colonised peoples were like
children . . . and insufficiently developed to deserve human
rights” (Mayblin 2017). Hence, the limited application of
the human rights to seek asylum from persecution, which
was further policed as decolonization continued. Mayblin
contends:
“the distinction between the need to protect desir-
able and deserving refugees and the need to keep
‘coloured’ people out of the country followed the in-
here/out-there distinction of the Old Empire. All sub-
jects of the Empire were legally equal, but when non-
white subjects sought a home in Great Britain, great
effort was made to limit their number” (Mayblin 2017,
145).
Some of this effort is embedded in the drafting of the
Refugee Convention and so applies not just to Britain, but
also internationally. In addition to the geographic and tem-
poral constraints on the definition of a refugee, refugees
were given only the right to ask for protection from persecu-
tion and the right to be protected, in certain circumstances,
from forced return to their country of habitual residence,
but they were not given the right to enter and settle in a host
state. This remains a benefit a state can choose to bestow.
It follows from the individualistic definition of persecu-
tion in the Refugee Convention that only individuals are
eligible for refugee status and resettlement, and cases are
assessed on an individual basis. This norm has solidified
in legal precedent over time (Musalo Moore, and Boswell
2007). Groups and collectives too easily represent a threat
to a state. The Convention definition of a refugee requires
that an individual is outside of their home country and that
they are fleeing persecution that is targeted at them as a
particular person. In this way, it does not have to account
for harms done to individuals through colonial oppressions
or their legacies, which might involve restrictions on free-
dom of movement and almost certainly involve discrimina-
tory and arbitrary practices in the application of justice. In-
deed, it does not have to account for any group-based harms
such as cases of genocide or ethnic cleansing. Western in-
terpretations of the definition in refugee and asylum law as
it has been adopted by individual states and by the Euro-
pean Union reflect the emphasis on the individual; for ex-
ample, it is not enough for an individual seeking asylum to
prove they belong to a particular religious group that is per-
secuted in a given country, but they must also credibly testify
that they have been individually targeted and have reason to
believe that they will be targeted again (Musalo Moore, and
Boswell 2007). The legal emphasis on individuals means that
a person who travels in a group must prove their distinction
from the group. In other words, the refugee definition pro-
tects individuals from suffering persecution for which they
are targeted as a result of their group-based characteristics,
that is, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion. It specifically does not
protect the group itself. It is worth noting that, by separating
the individual experiencing persecution from the group,
the definition inoculates the state against protecting groups
from persecution, and leaves the state free to abandon, ex-
clude, and discriminate against—indeed, persecute—entire
groups in defense of state interests. This reality is embed-
ded in the experience of Jewish refugees post-World War II
whose very group status constructed them as a problem.
The idea of the virtuous refugee individual, who can be
extracted from a threatening group, belies the reluctance of
states to admit any refugee or asylum seeker. It relies on con-
trolling the “group,” the perception of an influx of migrants,
in order to allow benevolent liberal states to welcome the
deserving individual. Consequently, the ‘illegal immigrant’
becomes the deviant, whose demise is an unfortunate con-
sequence of his own misadventure. The very act of making
individual assessment of persecution that is itself targeted,
by definition, at a group always already permits exclusion.
As Mayblin argued, cited above, this exclusion derives from
“the distinction between the need to protect desirable and
deserving refugees and the need to keep ‘coloured’ people
out” (Mayblin 2017, 145). The need to offer protection is
key to the liberal narrative of equality and human rights,
while the tandem need to maintain racialized restrictions
on that protection reflects the hierarchies of colonialism
whereby colonized people were excluded, by design, from
international human rights (Mayblin 2017; Whyte 2019).
The Refugee Convention took place in the context of
anti-colonial movements and decolonization. Taking into
account the legacies of colonialism and the practices of de-
colonization that have fed into existing rights regimes rein-
forces evidence for the limitations inherent in the Western
liberal attitude to human rights. For example, Jessica Whyte
argues that the powerful and wealthy states sought to limit
access to social and economic rights when establishing in-
ternational human rights legislation. She asserts that while
these limitations were couched in the language of avoiding
economic planning and opening a gateway to communism,
they were actually a means of protecting the welfare state
in wealthy states, which relied on processes of colonial ex-
traction (Whyte 2019; see also Duffield 2007). By requiring
an open market and privileging private enterprise over state
economic planning, the structural inequalities that were
wrought by colonialism would not be corrected and there-
fore would permit continued extraction to sustain wealth in
the Global North. Indeed, Britain in particular was leery of
the universal application of social and economic rights be-
cause it still held crown colonies that provided the wealth
to maintain social welfare in the British Isles. Agreeing that
all humans had the same right to social and economic wel-
fare in the 1940s would have compromised Britain’s ability
to provide it (Whyte 2019).
The Refugee Convention of course dealt with a parallel
problem: that of restricting incomers to those individuals
fleeing immediate danger of targeted persecution. Nadine
El-Enany addresses the colonial and racial architecture of
British immigration law, demonstrating that “Britain has al-
ways been an internally bordered, hostile environment for
migrants, with access to welfare made contingent on legal
status” (El-Enany 2020, 70). Thus, legal status was and is
heavily restricted, and the restrictions were formed with a
racial logic at their core. El-Enany traces the development of
postcolonial British citizenship, initially preserving the right
in law of all British colonial citizens to reside in the British
Isles and so instead constructing barriers to leaving colonial
territories in practice. A creeping eradication of that legal
right over each immigration act from 1962 onward culmi-
nated in the 1981 Act, which “crafted as white supremacist
a Britain as possible, short of introducing a ‘White Britain’
policy” (El-Enany 2020, 130). Nevertheless, refugee protec-
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(El-Enany 2020, 135) has been a longstanding rhetorical
exception to immigration restrictions. The need to preserve
the exception is posed adjacent to the logic of increasing
restrictions: that is that people will get tired of welcoming
incomers if too many incomers arrive. Thus, emerges the
fallacy that to allow only those demonstrating the most in-
tense and unavoidable persecution will preserve protection.
This is a fallacy because the logic—that too many people will
compromise any goodwill toward them—has actually been
used to eradicate protection over time. The welcome has
eroded preemptively. Mayblin (2017) systematically demon-
strates this eradication of protection over time from the in-
ception of asylum policy in the 1990s and situates British
asylum policy in the colonial history of the refugee defini-
tion. She argues that the so-called rise of asylum seeking is
constituted as a problem in itself, producing in response poli-
cies that erode the right to asylum. However, properly chart-
ing the colonial history of refugee protection “bring[s] to
the fore histories of inequalities, which may have led to con-
temporary exclusions” (Mayblin 2017, 29). This history of
inequalities is relevant in this context because the inequal-
ities in question refer to whole groups of people. Hence,
groups of refugees and asylum seekers correspond to histor-
ically unequal groups but are not provided for in refugee
protection. As the case study demonstrates, rejecting groups
on the grounds that they do not have a legitimate claim
to refugee status is part of the founding logic of refugee
protection.
Methodology
There has been very little study of the Jewish camps in
Cyprus in the latter half of the 1940s. The notable excep-
tions include Rappas (2019) whose study observes the shift
in language and perception of the Jewish refugees, from
refugee to illegal immigration. This acknowledgment is em-
bedded in a broader study of how the camps related to
the relationship between the colonial administration and
the Cypriot population. His argument looks to the legitima-
tion of the political agency of colonized people with regard
to territorial sovereignty in colonized territories. The main
contribution here is an assertion as to what this naming
means for Cypriot political agency and imperial governance
more broadly. I build on this to consider what the language
of “illegal immigration” means in particular for refugees and
for the broader implications of the refugee definition.
A second notable study of the Cyprus camps is Teutsch’s
(2019) “Essential Research Guide” to the Cyprus detention
camps. This guide seeks to catalog all the available informa-
tion about Jewish landings in Cyprus, the camps, conditions
inside them, and how they have been recorded officially and
memorialized in popular culture. This admirable effort pro-
vides significant information about the camps, bringing to-
gether disparate sources and challenging “lost” information.
Additionally, Goldman and Walsh (2009) and Goldman’s
(2015) research adds to documentary historical evidence
of the camps and the conditions therein. This research
engages the perspective and experience of the refugees—
particularly those who traveled on the ships Pan Crescent and
Pan York—to make a significant contribution to knowledge
of life in the camps for Jewish refugees. Nevertheless, de-
spite these exceptions, further analytical attention to these
camps at this significant historical moment in the develop-
ment of human rights and particularly refugee protection is
warranted.
The historical case study draws on the colonial records
archived at the UK National Archives. Drawing on the his-
torical documents from the Colonial Office and Foreign Of-
fice, which includes all the official correspondence and re-
ports of the camps allows insight into the varying positions
held and the developments over time with regard to the
negotiations as to the need for the camps, location of the
camps, and the capacity of the camps. These internal de-
bates illustrate the varying positions of the different offices.
The discussions are also positioned against negotiations at
the United Nations for the partition of Palestine, which is
reflected in the records. The details were not public and
were labeled “top secret;” thus in my analysis, I do not con-
sider it to be a language designed with a public audience
in mind. The language decisively produces the refugees as
“illegal immigrants” and the context from reports and cor-
respondence allows inference as to what this means in the
context of human rights and refugee protection set against
the backdrop of the colonial administration in Cyprus.
I carried out a systematic electronic search of UK archival
documents: the initial keyword search included the names
“Xylotymbou” and “Karaolos” as the named location of the
camps. I expanded the search to include documents that ref-
erenced information about Jewish refugees and immigrants
in Cyprus. An initial scoping of documents produced eight
folders (three Colonial Office, two Foreign Office, one Min-
istry of Defence and two Foreign and Commonwealth Office
folders) that I then reviewed closely at the archives. Within
these records there were fifty-five separate excerpts relat-
ing to the issue of Jewish refugees in Cyprus or diverted to
Cyprus and housed in the camps at Xylotymbou or Karaolos.
These folders spanned the years 1938–1952.
At the National Archives, I read and made a record of ex-
cerpts from the texts, using photographs of the relevant text.
These included fragments of colonial office reports regard-
ing Jewish immigrants to Cyprus prior to and during World
War II; the colonial context of British Mandate Palestine in
relation to refugee influxes; and the negotiations surround-
ing the camp construction, planning, economic manage-
ment, and disbanding. I analyzed the excerpts and coded
them thematically. The dominant themes that emerged
were as follows: (1) Economic interests: the colonial office
reports were interested in both the cost of maintaining the
camps and how these camps were relevant to the bargaining
power of Cypriot smallholding farmers. (2) Cypriot politics:
there were significant protests against the colonial occupa-
tion of Cyprus during the 1940s and the unpopularity of the
Jewish camps was noted in relation to this dissent. (3) Anti-
semitism: the colonial report of local press in Cyprus cited
antisemitism in Cyprus in the 1930s and advised against Jew-
ish resettlement in Cyprus, which later played into the logic
of containing refugees. (4) Responsibility: several archived
memos and telegrams denied British responsibility for the
well-being of Jewish refugees, demonstrating a hierarchy in
which Britain is responsible first for its own national in-
terest, and second for maintaining peace and support in
the Cypriot colony. (5) Illegal immigration: between 1946
and 1948 when Jewish refugees were interned in camps in
Cyprus, the documents refer to them almost exclusively as
“illegal immigrants” locating what is often thought of as a
contemporary distinction between refugees and illegal im-
migrants in the 1940s. Of these five themes, the first three
themes provide background information about colonial
Cyprus and the conception of the camps for Jewish refugees.
The latter two themes, responsibility and illegal immigration
respectively, offer scope for analysis of the significance of
this case in the context of refugee protection more broadly.
Accordingly, the following discussion proceeds to contextu-
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their significance to understand the problem of the “group”
in refugee protection, with particular focus on excerpts re-
garding “illegal immigration.”
Jewish Refugees in Cyprus 1946–1948
Jewish refugees of Europe are the very group of people
the Refugee Convention is so often cited as intending to
protect. Antisemitism was rife across Europe prior to and
during World War II; indeed, the British response to Jew-
ish refugees of World War II was characterized by visa re-
fusals and internment (London 2001). The establishment
of the United Nations and international human rights leg-
islation rewrote the narrative of European fascism, retroac-
tively framing fascism as rising in the 1930s in response to
the Great Depression and ending in 1945 at the end of
World War II. However, as Saucier and Woods (2014) ar-
gue, fascism was always and already present in Europe, evi-
denced in colonial and imperial policies, and the Holocaust
was the moment at which it was explicitly and undeniably
geographically evident within Europe. Antisemitism contin-
ued to frame the British response to Jewish refugees beyond
1945. I consider the period immediately following World
War II, between 1946 and 1948 during which Britain impris-
oned Jewish refugees in purpose-built containment camps,
maintaining and reproducing a belief that the Jewish pop-
ulation of Europe was a “problem to be solved.” This mo-
ment in history represents a void in the conventional ac-
counts of European liberalism and human rights. I argue
that this overlooked history provides powerful evidence that
refugees, asylum seekers, and uninvited migrants are consti-
tuted as a problem to be solved, rather than humans in pos-
session of rights. This case is particularly powerful because
the very group that is cast as a problem and labeled “illegal
immigrants” is the group that was explicitly victimized and
persecuted in the preceding years that led to this founda-
tional movement for universal human rights, that is, the Jew-
ish population of Europe. Moreover, because the means of
solving the problem of refugees relies on extracting harm-
less individuals from threatening groups, the ability to op-
press and exclude the group itself is preserved and observ-
able, justified by the idea of incoming groups of migrants as
a threat to security.
Colonial Cyprus
Cyprus was under British rule between 1878 and 1960, al-
though it only officially became a crown colony in 1925;
prior to that, the territory was annexed by Britain from the
Ottoman Empire and then, in 1914 unilaterally annexed,
or occupied, by Britain before being officially colonized.
Cyprus has a long history of foreign occupation and the
colonial experience under Britain was ambivalent. British
rule was welcomed both as more “tolerant” than the Ot-
toman regime and as a route to the unification of Cyprus
with Greece as there was precedent to assume Britain would
cede the territory (Katsourides 2014, 31). Katsourides finds
in his evaluation of political cleavages in colonial Cyprus
between 1925 and 1960 that despite ethnic cleavage, class
cleavage, and a cleavage regarding the form anti-colonialism
should take, there was a shared “common strategic goal of
removing the British and ending Cyprus’s colonial status”
(Katsourides 2014, 42). Thus, the position of the British was
tenuous despite a lack of cohesion in the anti-colonial and
anti-imperial movements. Demetriou situates this timeline
of anti-British and pro-enosis (unification with Greece) polit-
ical actions as gathering force in 1921 and continuing “in fits
and spurts” until the end of the Second World War at which
point it started to gain momentum (Demetriou 2007, 175).
The years of interest to this case study represent a political
climate of growing dissent toward British rule, which expli-
cates British caution toward a new and potentially destabiliz-
ing group of incomers in the form of Jewish refugees.
Despite the opposition to British rule, the second half of
the 1940s was a period of economic growth and develop-
ment particularly in the East of the island. Investment in mil-
itary infrastructure stimulated economic growth with road
construction and the enlargement of the port. In particular,
the city of Famagusta grew and as the population increased
so did the demand for housing, creating more jobs and
further stimulating the economy (Goldman 2015; Varnava
2015; Innes 2020). Part of the construction boom in the
area surrounding Famagusta included the camps that would
house Jewish refugees who were apprehended on their way
to Palestine.
British Internment Camps for Jewish Refugees: 1946–1948
Jewish immigration to British Mandate Palestine (1918–
1948) started to increase following the Balfour Declaration
of 1917 and continued in the years preceding and during
World War II. Immediately following World War II, as a con-
sequence of the massive Jewish refugee numbers in Europe,
there was a new influx of Jewish immigration toward Pales-
tine. Britain had augmented efforts to limit this immigra-
tion during the war years as it sought to maintain Arab sup-
port and the Arab population was opposed to the number
of Jewish incomers. At the end of the war, Palestinian Jews
strengthened efforts to bring Jewish refugees from across
Europe to British Mandate Palestine. Britain continued to
control the number of incomers to Palestine to maintain
the support of Palestinian Arabs. Following a 1946 attack on
the King David Hotel in Jerusalem by the Jewish Resistance
movement, Britain adopted the policy objective of stopping
Jewish immigration to Palestine altogether, and thus began
intercepting ships in the Mediterranean that were traveling
toward Palestine and redirecting them to the closest British
crown colony: Cyprus (Goldman 2015).
The UK Foreign Office records logged concern, in re-
sponse to alarmist reports in local media, about Jewish im-
migration into Cyprus in the latter half of the 1930s (FCO
141/2618, 1938–1952). In the first half of the 1930s, Cyprus
was considered a possible location for resettlement of the
European Jewish population, due to the identified and then
unexploited economic potential of the island, and its prox-
imity to Palestine (Rappas 2019). Nevertheless, as Jewish ap-
plications for resettlement in Cyprus grew in tandem with
land purchases, the Cypriot press began to express trepida-
tion. The colonial Press Office’s report in August of 1938
summarized the concern articulated by several local newspa-
pers regarding Jewish incomers to Cyprus (FCO 141/2618,
1938–1952). The main concern of the British was that local
unrest might threaten stable governance of the island; such
stability had already been called to question in 1931 when
the Governor’s mansion in Nicosia was burned in protest
against British rule, leading to the British establishing an
authoritarian grip on the island with far greater restrictions
on political autonomy than was habitual in similar colonies
(Holland 1998). The British records offer no challenge to
the idea of a potential threat posed by Jewish resettlement,
reflecting the status quo of antisemitism that characterized
the era. An extract from the Press Officer’s report for August
1938 refers to the “continuous fear of a Jewish penetration
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nces referred to the concern that Jewish immigration would
threaten local jobs and resources. This concern at the be-
ginning of the War was not alleviated in intervening years;
yet, for the British colonial government, the disruption in
Palestine attributed to incoming Jewish refugees seeking re-
settlement in the territory provoked more serious concerns
after the War. Nevertheless, Britain was not prepared, de-
spite the persecution and genocide of World War II, to risk
unrest in Cyprus or Palestine in order to provide settlement
for Jewish refugees in either of these territories. It can be
inferred that temporary or permanent resettlement of Jew-
ish refugees in Cyprus was not considered to be a workable
option for the British government because of the potential
for instability in the colony. British interests outweighed the
needs of stateless refugees.
The potential for instability and the precedent of ob-
jection to Jewish immigration to Cyprus meant that, while
British policy was to detain refugees in Cyprus, the incomers
were carefully managed by the British in the 1940s. Britain’s
policy of containing and imprisoning Jewish refugees can
be understood as a strategy to avoid accepting responsibility
for the refugees. Refugees were intercepted on journeys to
Palestine and taken to Cyprus, while assuaging local Cypriot
fears that resettlement in Cyprus was being substituted for
resettlement in Palestine. The camps were temporary hold-
ing centers during negotiations for the partition of Pales-
tine; yet despite its temporariness, the detention did not
have a fixed endpoint and so was indefinite. The action
of detaining refugees allowed Britain to abdicate respon-
sibility for them. In a Foreign Office telegram from 1947,
it was made clear that as long as “H.M.G. exercise author-
ity in Palestine, they must enforce immigration laws.” (FO
371/61894, 1947). In correspondence of December 1948,
diplomat John Beith recalls that Jewish detainees in Cyprus
were being held, while the United Nations came to deter-
mine the plan for Palestine. In correspondence with a Mr
Martin on the 21st of December 1948, Beith calls for a de-
cision to be taken on the camps because “The Assembly has
now done its best (or worst) about Palestine” (CO 537/4058,
1948). Britain had been holding Jewish refugees in an in-
terim period without accepting responsibility for their well-
being. Rather, Britain had produced a temporary solution
to the problem of Jewish resettlement, and the period for
which this solution of containment would be employed was
indeterminate. Britain was not willing or able to resolve the
“problem” of the refugees and was waiting for the appro-
priate moment to abdicate responsibility for Palestinian im-
migration law. Given that these Jewish refugees were Holo-
caust survivors, many of whom had experienced first-hand
internment in Nazi concentration camps, the willingness
to employ detention in this way not only shows, of course,
an astounding lack of empathy, but also evidences the ex-
tent of antisemitism and the reality that Jewish refugees
were, as stateless people, denied any access to human rights.
The refugee convention was conceived in this context: the
group presented a problem. States were unwilling or un-
able to guarantee resettlement for whole groups of refugees
who could be constituted politically as a security threat, and
this particular case can be taken as exemplary. The group
of Jewish refugees could not be accommodated because of
the potential threat to stability in colonial Cyprus or man-
date Palestine. Thus, the group was contained. As indicated
above, there was already dissent toward the colonial govern-
ment within the Cypriot population, including movements
both for enosis—unification—with Greece and for indepen-
dence from Britain (Holland 1998; Katsourides 2014). This
resulted in a much stricter and more centralized form of
colonial governance in Cyprus than in other colonial ter-
ritories. In the context of Jewish refugees, Britain did not
want to risk further dissatisfaction and dissent by offering a
form of Jewish resettlement that permitted basic freedoms.
British colonial interests remained the predominant con-
cern in this case.
Camps as the “Solution” to the “Problem”
According to Teutsch’s (2019) account, which draws on lo-
cal media reports, the British authorities brought 800 Ger-
man prisoners of war to Cyprus in order to build the camp
in Xylotymbou forest, in which the Jewish refugees would
be imprisoned. The British authorities arranged the con-
struction of a total of twelve camps with the capacity to
house 24,000 people. Over 52,000 people were brought to
Cyprus and resided there between 1946 and 1948, leaving
the camps overcrowded at almost double their capacity as a
direct result of British policy decisions discussed at length
in correspondence between and among officers in the Colo-
nial Office, the Colonial Governor’s administration on the
island, and the UK delegation to the United Nations. For
example, in a 1947 instruction, the Colonial Office directed
that “illegal immigrants should, if necessary, be put into ac-
commodation for 8000 without regard for the immediate
availability of beds (FO 371/61894, 1947).” In June 1947,
the camp holdings on the island were increased from 30,000
to 34,000, which involved “encroachment on space now de-
voted to recreational facilities and reduc([ing] living space
to the minimum justifiable,” with further expansions being
ruled out due to the lack of available water supply (FO
371/61894, 1947). The British pushed occupation of the
camps to the absolute maximum capacity possible while still
avoiding direct risk of death as a result of the conditions.
Jewish refugees were not welcomed as victims of persecution
to be afforded human rights. Rather, they were imprisoned
in inhumane and undignified conditions while Britain de-
termined how to resolve the issue of this group.
As referenced above, the Jewish refugees were housed in
two main camp locations—Karaolos and Xylotymbou. These
were undeniably detention camps that were designed specif-
ically to prevent freedom of movement of a population
that the British correspondence referred to as “illegal im-
migrants.” The camps were comprised of rows of huts and
tents along the main thoroughfare. They were subject to
controls on movement and activity. They were fenced with
barbed wire. There was poor sanitation and poor nutrition
inside the camps. Goldman records the description of the
camps given by Golda Meir in 1947, painting a bleak picture
of conditions:
[…] more depressing that expected, in a way worse
than the camps for Displaced Persons […]. They
looked like prison camps, ugly clusters of huts and
tents, with watchtowers […] and nothing green
or growing anywhere in sight. There wasn’t nearly
enough water for drinking and even less for bathing,
despite the heat (Goldman 2015, 215, citing Meir
1975).
The point to underscore here is that these were without mis-
take detention camps designed to house a specific population
that was unwanted and that no one knew what to do with.
The camps were run by the military complete with watch-
towers and armed guards. Indeed, in response to calls to ex-
pand the camps, the reluctant Colonial Governor in Cyprus
elaborated that not only would a greater number of immi-
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accommodate the military troops “needed to guard and ser-
vice them,” amounting to “one battalion per 15,000 illegal
immigrants (CO 537/2485, 1947).”
It is clear that the camps were controversial among British
colonial administrators not due to concern about the phys-
ical and psychological welfare of refugees, but due to con-
cern about British economic and political interests. Jewish
refugees remained a threatening group rather than individ-
uals who might be in possession of liberal rights. The prior-
ity of economic interests is evident in correspondence sent
to Arthur Creech-Jones, including a report from Govern-
ment House Cyprus that details the scarcity of fresh produce
and water (CO 537/2485, 1947). The colonial office report
on the economic situation attributes scarcity of foodstuffs,
in particular oil, to the “peasantry” and smallhold farm-
ers of the island elevating prices and withholding supplies
(CO 537/2485, 1947). Yet the colonial office clarified that
the same population, who are apparently benefitting from
the economic stretching of the British colonial authorities,
are unlikely to accept greater numbers of Jewish refugees,
and upsetting the balance would be politically disastrous
for the British governance of the crown colony. Of course,
this is happening in the context of Cypriot uprisings against
British rule. Ultimately, as the overcrowded camps became
more and more untenable, and as local Cypriots started to
make efforts to help Jewish refugees escape the camps, the
solution proposed by the UK delegation to the United Na-
tions was one of abandonment. The Jewish refugees would
no longer be a British problem once Britain had ended
mandate authority over Palestine; hence, the resolution pro-
posed for Britain is a staged withdrawal from the Palestinian
territory, specifically: “first stage might include for instance
abandonment of area along coast from Caesarea to Tel Aviv,
involving cessation of landings on this coast (FO 371/61894,
1947).” It is worth noting that this is not a solution that
refers to Jewish refugees, the Cypriot population, or Pales-
tinian Arabs. British interests only are at the core of this
suggestion, and the identified interest was to abdicate any
responsibility for the “landings,” which referred to refugee
boats.
Illegal Immigrants
Nevertheless, refugees were traveling toward Palestine and
being detained in Cyprus in the context of a growing inter-
national interest in human rights. It is notable that Jewish
refugees were referred to as “illegal immigrants” in almost
all examples of correspondence between the relevant units
of the British government between 1946 and 1949. Rappas
marks this shift in language as first happening as early as
1939, when Britain backed away from responsibility for this
group of migrants, with an official in the colonial office stat-
ing:
“we owe a greater duty to our Cypriot citizens than
to alien Jews many of whom are not even attempt-
ing to escape from persecution. If disease breaks out
on these ships it will no doubt be a terrible thing,
but presumably the crew will dump their cargo into
the sea and I cannot see that any responsibility can
be attached to us because the immigrants fail to sur-
vive what they well know to be a dangerous adventure
(Rappas 2019, citing CO 67/302/14, 1939).”
The rejection of responsibility, placing it instead on the indi-
vidual for setting out on a dangerous journey, echoes liberal
individualist logic. The referral to “cargo” that is apparently
disposable dehumanizes the Jewish refugees and raises the
specter of the 1781 Zong massacre, when the crew of a slave
shipped dumped their “cargo” of slaves into the sea, tracing
a continuity in the racialized and dehumanizing practices of
British colonialism and demonstrating antisemitism in prac-
tice. What is particularly significant, though, in the case of
refugee law and policy, is the way this use of language further
characterizes the distinction between the group and the in-
dividual. In 1939, when European Jews were persecuted and
were a collective under threat, the persecution still had to be
individually targeted to qualify them for protection. The lan-
guage suggesting many of the Jews were “not even attempt-
ing to escape from persecution” suggests that all Jews were
not in fact in danger, and many were exploiting the perse-
cution of others as a means of pursuing a new life. The idea
that people pretend to be persecuted in order to pursue
desirable migration has endured and, given what we know
about the Holocaust, this example in particular highlights
the absurdity of this line of thought.
In the aftermath of World War II, Jewish refugee num-
bers were critical, and in 1946 when Britain introduced
much larger-scale detention in camps in Cyprus their des-
ignation as “illegal immigrants” became crucial; as Rappas
(2019) argues, Britain’s liberal political identity could not
account for the detention of refugees who had survived
Nazi concentration camps. Particularly throughout 1947 in
correspondence between the Foreign Office, the Colonial
Office, Government House Cyprus, and the UK delegation
at the United Nations, the occupants of the camps were
described only as “illegal immigrants.” For example, cor-
respondence discussing the potential to extend the camps
in June 1947 repeatedly refers to the number of military
personnel required per 15,000 “illegal immigrants” (CO
537/2485, 1947); a telegram dated June 26, 1947, from
Lord Winster in Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the
Colonies was titled “Illegal Immigrants” and detailed the in-
crease in camp capacity that would encroach on the recre-
ational space (FO 371/61894, 1947). A report from Govern-
ment House Cyprus to the Colonial Office lodged the same
year makes an economic case for reducing the size of the
military and “illegal immigrant” population (CO 537/2485,
1947). An outward telegram from the Foreign Office on
October 14, 1947, reprises the idea that “the only alterna-
tive to the policy of interning illegal immigrants is to repel
them by naval action” (FO 371/61894, 1947). A telegram cit-
ing “Foreign Office opinion on official level” dated October
20, 1947, is entitled “Illegal Immigration” and discusses the
camps in Cyprus, providing the UK delegation to the United
Nations the most recent information of discussion between
the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office on the state of
camps in Cyprus (FO 371/61894, 1947). Jewish detainees
are repeatedly referred to as illegal immigrants in these doc-
uments. Indeed, the Colonial Office files containing the de-
tailed information about the camps in Cyprus are titled “Jew-
ish Camps: detention of illegal immigrants in Cyprus” (CO
537/4058, 1948 and CO 537/4983, 1949).
In 1949, Israel lodged a case against Britain’s continued
detention of military-age men in Cyprus. The judgment en-
tered in response perhaps offers the most clarity as to Britain
considering the inhabitants of the camps to be illegal im-
migrants. The judgment established that the men were de-
tained as illegal immigrants. It was irrelevant, according to
Judge Griffith Williams, whether Britain had changed pol-
icy regarding men of military age; they were detained un-
der immigration laws and therefore “the government was
perfectly justified under those laws in releasing such of the
illegal immigrants it wanted to release and to continue to






/isagsq/article/1/3/ksab023/6373827 by guest on 20 O
ctober 2021
8 Refugees or Illegal Immigrants
are lawfully detained under the Detention (Illegal Immi-
gration) Laws 1946–48 and are not entitled to the writ of
Habeas Corpus they ask for” (CO 537/4983, 1949). The oc-
cupants of the camps were unequivocally considered to be
illegal immigrants and, therefore, under the relevant immi-
gration law, not entitled to Habeas Corpus. The rule of law
not only bestows rights, but also prevents access to rights.
Recognizing the Jewish refugees as such was not con-
sidered or even posed as an option for the British gov-
ernment. A Foreign Office report of 1947, cited above,
ied that “the only alternative to the policy of interning il-
legal immigrants is to repel them by naval action and we do
not think the risk of serious loss of life could be accepted”
(FO 371/61894, 1947). This logic and the language and le-
gal identity of the refugees as illegal immigrants expose the
paradox of the group: the choice proposed is to either in-
tern the refugees or allow them to die at sea. They cannot be
refugees, because refugees are deserving of protection. In-
stead, as a group of “illegal immigrants,” they are a problem
that requires a solution. The redeemable individual refugee
can only exist once separate from the group.
The Paradox of Protection
The case of Jewish refugees in Cyprus in the latter half of
the 1940s clearly demonstrates the problem of the group for
the United Kingdom. The case is a crucial but overlooked
context for the development of refugee law and policy. The
group was potentially politically destabilizing in a small and
already internally contested colony. Britain refused to risk
upsetting the delicate balance of colonial governance in
Cyprus by offering protection—even temporarily—for Jew-
ish refugees. Instead, the refugees were recast as illegal im-
migrants and their lives were suspended as they were con-
tained indefinitely in camps where they had no basic free-
doms. This context reveals a general principle as to why
group protections are not offered in the refugee conven-
tion. States are wary of the potentially destabilizing proper-
ties of groups.
However, what remains is the question as to how the con-
ditions of oppression are maintained at the group level.
People who qualify for refugee status do so because they
have suffered persecution due to a group-based identity
characteristic—race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion. Yet, the group
itself is not offered protection. Therefore, if a whole group
is being persecuted it is very difficult for an individual to ex-
tract themself from the group and they become subsumed
in a category that is considered threatening and undeserv-
ing of protection. It is enshrined in refugee law that groups
of people are persecuted and paradoxically, also, that perse-
cuted groups cannot be protected.
Conclusion
The mechanisms that blur ways, forms, and categories of
migration work as a continuation of the racializing logic
that functions to contain a group while maintaining an ide-
ology of universal human rights. This remains evident in the
contemporary context: for example, echoing the distinction
between “Jewish refugees” and “illegal immigrants” of the
1940s, a distinction was made between Syrian refugees of
2015 and the larger group. The group was and is all people
who fall into a broader category of “migrant” who are also
variously labeled as undocumented, irregular, or illegal.
This is the threatening group that is not afforded access to
rights and protections. This group is contained in camps or
informal statuses with little or no access to social and eco-
nomic protection or civic participation. As the case of Jewish
refugees in 1940s Cyprus demonstrates, the need to contain
the group and the impossibility of providing rights to the
group was established simultaneously with the promulga-
tion of some of the core documents of international human
rights, including the Refugee Convention. Detaining and
restraining the freedom of a group that is constructed as
threatening to dominant power interests become justifiable
actions. The mechanism by which the group is contained is
enshrined and protected in core human rights documents.
The disqualification of certain bodies from access to rights
is a result of colonial, racializing, and dehumanizing logics
and practices that echo the internment of Jewish refugees
in the second half of the 1940s.
This article has situated the convention definition of a
refugee in the context of post-war Europe, and specifically
in the actions of the British colonial government of Cyprus.
These actions are tied to the interests of Britain in maintain-
ing the crown colony. As extant literature has demonstrated,
colonial interests were meaningful in the development of in-
ternational human rights, and protection for refugees is no
exception to this. This case is particularly evocative because
it examines a group of people who should represent the very
core of the refugee definition: victims of persecution who
have been displaced due to events before 1951 in Europe.
Yet, their status as a group denies them protection because
as a group they are perceived as threatening political stabil-
ity. The refugee convention offers protection from persecu-
tion motivated by group-based characteristics yet replicates
the very conditions in which those group-based persecutions
take place.
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